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Cyber security is one of the growing concerns across the 21st Century world.  For the private 
sector, proper cyber security allows organizations to protect themselves against the increasing 
threat of cyber-attacks. These businesses play a critical role by implementing robust security 
infrastructures that ensure, to the extent possible, the protection of personal and corporate data. 
At the same time, governments have a major role to play in influencing the decisions that 
organizations make, especially as it relates to customer data. The current privacy and 
cybersecurity landscape in Canada has developed over time as a way to hold organizations 
accountable in protecting the customer information that they collect in the course of their 
business.  
 
This analysis considers the research question of whether or not the existing legislative/regulatory 
framework in Canada is sufficient to deal with the cyber threats being faced by individual 
corporations. There is both a shared interest and, arguably, responsibility in addressing the risks 
associated with cyber threats among the government, private sector, and individuals.  However, 
sharing a common interest against a shared threat, while important, does not necessarily override 
the expectations that businesses and citizens have respecting unfettered access to the Internet. As 
a result, for the government, the dilemma becomes one of balance; balance between achieving 
the appropriate level of regulation in order to protect users of the internet and their overall 
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“The first gasoline-powered vehicle driven on the streets of Detroit was built 
by engineer Charles Brady King in 1896. It went as fast as 20 miles per hour, 
which was described in the newspaper as "tearing along the street at a lively 
rate, dodging people and teams". By 1909, there were 200,000 motor vehicles 
in the United States, and by 1916, that number had expanded to 2.25 million. 
 
While the arrival of the motorized vehicle saw various cities implementing 
safety measures such as stop signs, rudimentary lane markings, one-way 
streets and traffic signals, there were significant numbers of serious injuries 
and fatalities. It was not until the mid-1920s, almost 30 years after the arrival 
of that first vehicle in Detroit, that a uniform approach to highway safety 




Since the late 1980s, technological advances and growing global activities have 
combined to place significant focus and pressure around the question of how best to regulate the 
cyber world. We have witnessed the evolution of teenage hackers breaking into computer 
networks on a dare, through a growing incidence of disrupted and defaced websites, through 
increasing concerns around the malicious spread of viruses and worms and the major risk to 
business operations that they carry. We have seen an intensive increase in the cyber theft of 
personal identity, and most recently, we are experiencing the growing criminal focus of 
individuals and groups on espionage against governments and major corporate organizations. 
The media regularly reports on large-scale data losses, service outages and cyber breaches that 
are experienced with growing frequency and impact.  
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Addressing the issue of the introduction of gasoline powered vehicles eventually moved 
beyond reactive scrambling to installing simple stop signs and traffic lights to instituting a 
comprehensive system of highway safety legislation and regulation that is continually refined as 
threats shift and evolve. We now face a similar evolutionary dilemma with our digital 
superhighways operating in cyberspace. The risks are simply too great to allow full individual 
and organizational freedom in how the Internet is harnessed as we are beginning to see 
unacceptable levels of harm that result. It is time to develop and implement a comprehensive 
scheme for the acceptable regulation of cyber security in the interests of protecting all users.  
The problem appears not so much in recognizing that computer-based threats and 
vulnerabilities exist, but rather in identifying the nature of those threats as a precursor to creating 
the optimal prevention and reaction strategies. There is significant motivation to address these 
matters, given that the victims of the growing cyber damage range from national governments 
through various corporations to single individuals. There is a growing and shared interest in 
addressing this problem, among the government, private sector, and individuals, all of whom 
benefit from ensuring the implementation and regulation of the cyber world.  
It is not as simple as identifying a common interest against a shared threat, however. In a 
liberal democracy such as Canada, businesses and citizens also expect unfettered access to the 
Internet, for both personal and business purposes. Any proposed limits on this freedom are given 
serious consideration and critique, as elected officials debate whether the necessity of regulation 
outweighs the restriction of freedom in a capitalist society. The dilemma becomes one of 
balance: how far should a government go to achieve the appropriate level of regulation so as to 
protect users of the Internet, without unnecessarily infringing on individual liberties? When does 
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a legitimate focus on safety creep into unjustified overreach? For individuals and organizations 
engaged in the digital world, these are critical questions. 
As cyber issues continue to evolve and threats increase, there will be heightened 
expectations on the Government of Canada to play a strong leadership role and coordinate efforts 
across both the public and private sectors in the country.  However, as the government directs its 
immediate attention to the hostile actions of other nation-states, crime rings, and individual 
hackers, we need to ask if the current laws and regulations in place related to cyber-security for 
private corporations are sufficient to manage the inherent and growing risks associated with 
cyber security. The test is to achieve a level where the government’s role in providing effective 
checks and balances exists so that security can be enhanced while intrusions into individual 
liberties are minimized.  
Governments, businesses, and individuals are all vulnerable to attack.  The private sector, 
however, is being targeted on an exponentially increasing basis.  Typically, hackers appear to be 
one step ahead of organizations, despite the various security measures in place. Admittedly, 
responding to these incidents requires a significant investment that is often as much, if not more, 
than the costs associated with proactive efforts to secure IT related network systems.  Even with 
these increasing investments, there is a growing regulatory and consumer impatience that both 
the proactive and reactive measures amount to ‘too little, too late’.   
At face value, the status quo cannot be considered sufficiently robust to handle existing 
and emerging threats, especially given the ever-evolving sophistication of attackers. There 
remains an ongoing need to continue to revisit the cyber strategies that exist, and the 
Government of Canada, working with the private sector, needs to ensure that more is being done 
at the federal, provincial, and even local levels.  This was all but admitted in the Executive 
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Summary of a recent report from the country’s Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce, in which it was made clear that Canada “has offered only limp responses to this real 
and rising threat,” and that the “federal government should be leading efforts to make Canadians’ 
information more secure…” (Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce, 2018, p.1). 
At the same time, the changing cyber landscape is being influenced by the growth of new 
types of digital business and technology.  Digitized commodities will expand and increasingly be 
provided as automated products and systems in business-to-business and business-to-consumer 
relationships, impacting all facets of consumer life. Is the government keeping up to the  
changing world?  With recent innovations like Internet of Things (IoT), and even 
cryptocurrency, Canada’s challenge is also to find the right balance between oversight and 
innovation, recognizing that it may no longer be sufficient to rely upon existing legislative 
frameworks. Laws and regulations designed to protect Canadians have been slow to adjust to 
these emerging technologies. 
This paper will: 
(1) analyze the challenges and inherent risks associated with the overall use of technology 
related to the protection of customer information; 
(2) review the current Canadian statutory framework related to the regulation of privacy and data 
management practices affecting cybersecurity and the regulatory and governance framework 
for specific federally regulated financial institutions (FRFIs)1;  
 
1 FRFIs include banks, federally incorporated trust and loan companies, life insurance companies, fraternal benefit societies and 
property and casualty insurance companies.  
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(3) review the regulatory due diligence required of these organizations, by federal regulators, in 
their handling of the personal information of their customers, whether within their possession 
or after having been outsourced to a third-party provider; and,  
(4) determine whether the current standards, policies, and practices in place are sufficient to 






Cyber related Challenges 
 
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) of Canada is a non-partisan, Ombudsman 
Office reporting to the Parliament of Canada. It oversees the country’s Privacy Act and provides 
advice and information to the federal government, businesses, and individuals on the topic of 
protecting personal information.  The OPC outlines various challenges related to cybersecurity 
(Canada. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2014, sec. 1), including: 
  
1. The continuing evolution of cyberspace, with its various interconnected networks, holds an 
enormous, and increasing, amount of data. Financial institutions have relied on information 
technology for decades, and some might argue, are fully dependent, on the digital data they 
have in their possession, including data that can be accessed in a cloud environment.  
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2. With the advent of distributed and multiple processing systems, these interconnected 
networks are inherently vulnerable.  New revelations of vulnerability will continue to surface 
as more complex and interconnected technological and communication systems become 
available.  
3. The unparalleled flexibility of Cloud Computing, that also promises to reduce costs, provides 
organizations an irresistible proposition especially in highly competitive industries, like 
financial services, especially during difficult economic periods.  Uses of Cloud Computing 
services will only likely increase as more and more organizations become comfortable 
moving their data outside of their perimeters. According to Dupont (2013), within the 
foreseeable future, one-third of all computer data will be stored in, and will transmit through, 
systems administered in the Cloud. 
4. The heavy reliance on mobile devices, by both individuals and corporations, in itself 
increases the cyber threats that exists.  For many businesses, mobile devices are becoming 
the central access device to company data and many users do not appreciate the security 
shortcomings of their phones and fail to enable the available software security.  For some, 
there remains a belief that ‘surfing the net’ on their phones being as safe, or even safer, than 
using their personal computers (Khan, Abbas, & Al-Muhtadi, 2015, p. 377). 
5. The insight, through data analytics, that companies can develop from ‘big data’ has been 
touted as the future to customer interactions. The ever-increasing amount of information and 
data collected, stored, and produced by the vast machines that are connected to the internet 
requires a continuous and regular review of security techniques used by businesses. 
However, the general thinking is, the bigger your data, the greater the opportunity it presents 
to hackers. 
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6. Privacy breaches continue to garner attention in the press. And while there may well be more 
focus on the overall issue in Canada, as well as throughout the rest of the world, 
organizations appear to still be unprepared for cyber threats and breaches.  
7. Finally, while companies are nonetheless required to comply with the various laws and 
regulations that impact them, when it comes to security, many succumb to a mechanical 
approach to overall compliance when responding to regulatory requirements.  Using a 
checklist mentality wherein an organization ticks off a box to indicate that an issue has been 




From a business perspective, what seems missing from their analysis, especially in light 
of the insights from the OPC, is an appreciation for the ongoing need to reevaluate the risks they 
face, and the overall security approach being taken. There does not appear to exist the need to 
either push for a ‘reboot’ of cyber security measures or at least the idea of revisiting their 
comprehensive strategy to address how cyber threats are managed. Instead, there appears to be a 
disconnect between the real challenges, threats and risks that organizations face and how best to 
address them. According to Craigen, Walsh & Whyte (2013), “it is impossible for any one 
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To varying degrees, countries are combatting cyber threats as almost all societies have 
become dependent on the Internet. While the public face of the cyber-attacks that confront 
Canadian society seems to continue to grow and evolve, does the Canadian government, 
corporations or individual citizens truly appreciate the breadth and depth of the dangerous threats 
currently in play? Potential adversaries are located throughout the world and, according to 
Lakomy (2013), there are several key reasons why Canadian organizations and Canadian citizens 
should take particular note of the intensifying cyberthreats they specifically face, including: 
 
1. International commitments - Canada has a strong legacy of effective engagement in 
peacekeeping and other related global security efforts.  For example, Canada is partnering 
with the European Union (EU), in a Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, assisting 
in the effort to establish effective and sustainable civilian police forces in the territories. 
Similarly, Canada is also engaged with the EU’s effort in assisting Ukraine in reforming its 
overall civil security, including police and the rule of law. Finally, after the 2001 terror 
attacks on the United States, Canada was part of the international coalition that was created 
to deal with the ongoing threats related to the al-Qaeda terrorist network, and the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan.  Terrorist groups in each of these areas have evolved in their cyber 
capabilities and it should not be underestimated that Canadian organizations could be victims 
of either direct or indirect attacks because of the country’s international commitments. 
2. Geography – Canada and the United States have historically maintained a key strategic 
alliance and economic partnership.  This has been heavily influenced by the physical 
proximity of these two nations. However, this same proximity exposes Canada to the harm 
caused by direct and indirect cyber-attacks on the United States.  Many corporations have 
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head offices in the U.S., with one or more branch offices or operations located in Canada.  As 
such, it is not uncommon for a successful cyber-attack on the systems of the main operation 
in the US having significant impacts on Canadian customers. And the multidimensional 
cooperation between the two countries both at the governmental and business levels may 
encourage both state and non-state actors to exploit cyberspace to target Canada.         
3. Past commitments to cybersecurity - there is also those who claim that Canada was relatively 
slow to adopt and implement its first official cyber-security strategy (Rosenzweig, 2012). 
Playing 'catch up' on the international stage in dealing with cyber threats puts the country at a 




Scott Jones, head of the newly created Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (the Cyber 
Centre) at the Canadian Security Establishment (CSE), the government agency now overseeing 
cyber issues in the country, in a recent speech indicated that “[e]very day, the CSE blocks 
hundreds of millions of malicious activities directed at the government of Canada” (Anonymous, 
Canadian Government is Improving its Cybersecurity, 2018, p 11).  
Jones indicated that the CSE “decided to break the cycle and make it harder for people to 
discover our vulnerabilities" (Anonymous, Canadian Government is Improving its 
Cybersecurity, 2018, p 11), claiming that the CSE is making it more difficult for attackers 
penetrate government networks, depriving them of any potential vulnerabilities in the software 
and services running on their networks.  He suggests that organizations similarly harden their 
CANADIAN CYBER SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATONS                                              13 
 
operating systems and applications (Anonymous, Canadian Government is Improving its 
Cybersecurity, 2018, p 11). 
This advice is especially prudent for financial institutions in Canada and his comments 
are likely an indication that he feels more can be done. Their heavy reliance on informational 
technology and overall dependency on the interconnectivity of the global financial systems that 
they use makes them particularly vulnerable. Cyber criminals continue to target financial 
institutions not only in North America but around the world.  These attacks embody both internal 
and external attacks using such techniques as ransomware, Distribution Denial of Service 
(DDoS) and sophisticated phishing campaigns. 
While the Canadian rate of cyber breaches might be considered relatively low when 
compared to, for example, the United States, the average organization still faces 96 targeted 
attacks each year, one-third of which result in a successful security breach (Thomas, 2017).  
Over twenty percent of Canadian businesses reported being impacted by a cyber security 
incident which affected their overall operations and, after a breach, 49 percent of business lost 
customers, 43 percent reported damage to their brand, 41 percent had increased expenses and 37 
percent lost revenue (Statistics Canada, 2017).  Given the arguable disincentive to draw attention 
to cyber related attacks and losses, it is easy to imagine that this data is underreported.  
More recently, the U.S. watchdog, Risk Based Security, reported that Canada ranked third 
on its list of countries most impacted by cybercrime (Contant, 2018), perhaps not as surprising in 
Canada’s context as one of the “most wired” countries in the world, according to the Canadian 
Internet Registration Authority. In fact, “Canada has more computers per capita than any other 
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country….and Canadians are the heaviest Internet users in the world”. (Canada, Department of 
Finance, 2016, p. 1)  
Many large organizations rely on internal IT resources to help combat the threats that 
they face. Small to medium-sized businesses, challenged in their resource capacity, regularly 
turn to external experts for assistance, with many ‘outsourcing’ this function to cybersecurity 
consultants (CIRA, 2018).  Admittedly, whether using internal or third-party resources, no 
organization can ever be 100% secure; the threat environment that businesses operate in is 
simply moving too rapidly for a full and complete defense. In fact, “[c]urrent approaches to 
cybersecurity are ill-suited to detecting or anticipating threats, which increasingly rely on hybrid 
socio-technical vectors” (Craigen, Walsh & White, 2013, p. 14), including such things as 
phishing attacks because they combine both a technical and psychological component to entice a 
user. 
Despite this, most Canadian organizations indicate continued confidence that 
cybersecurity is being managed correctly (Stockburger, 2018).  They argue that the objective of 
implementing comprehensive, risk-based, layered approaches to secure their systems is 
appropriately balanced with the overall customer experience they are looking to provide. To the 
extent that cyber breaches occur, they are being dealt with adequately. It is apparent that, instead 
of attempting to fully secure their network systems, the approaches that businesses increasingly 
adopt are to make it a 'more trouble than it is worth' approach for prospective criminals to breach 
their systems, so that those would-be hackers will look elsewhere for easier targets.  
While Scott Jones summarized the general steps the CSE is taking to combat the threats 
the Government of Canada faces, at face value a far more active and aggressive strategy than has 
been taken in the past to defend the government’s networks from cyber-attacks, he has also taken 
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his message a step further by highlighting that organizations could benefit from a similar 
approach, suggesting a need for better all-around security measures.  However, no hint has been 
made that the Canadian Government is sharing information on the type of malicious attacks they 
face, and/or the specific steps they have taken as way of assisting private organizations in their 
efforts.  
It is interesting that the Canadian Government has endorsed the G7 Fundamental 
Elements of. Cybersecurity for the Financial Sector Guidelines (2016) meant to assist financial 
institutions in their overall efforts to design and implement appropriate cybersecurity strategies.  
These guidelines address issues ranging from ‘Governance’ to ‘Risk Assessment’ and from 
‘Monitoring’ to ‘Responding’ to cyber-attacks.  Of note is the recommendation that financial 
organizations “share reliable, actionable cybersecurity information with internal and external 
stakeholders to enhance defenses, limit damage, increase situational awareness and broaden 
learning” (G7, 2016).  
The guidelines are not mandatory on the financial sector in Canada but if the Canadian 
Government’s goal is for individual businesses to step up in this area it would be helpful if they 
first led by example.  The exchange of information requires a two-way street and there is 
currently no indication that the government has taken the necessary steps to share cybersecurity 
information with any stakeholders, especially those in the private sector. 
My recommendation to address this issue 
Private organizations could benefit from better collaboration and information sharing with the 
Canadian government.  Something as ‘simple’ as sharing information on the perpetrators behind 
the malicious attacks each are experiencing could result in a better strategic and structured 
approach to defending against attacks. The Government, through its various agencies, should 
lead by example and initiate the process of information sharing. 
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Canadian Landscape - Data Protection and Cybersecurity 
 
 
At the national level, only recently was the Cyber Centre established as a way to 
strengthen the national security regime in Canada and to allow for more focus on appropriate 
governmental responses to cyber threats and better coordination between various stakeholders 
engaged in similar efforts. Prior to this framework, which remains in its infancy, the agency 
responsible for coordinating the implementation of the nation’s cybersecurity strategy was Public 
Safety Canada, given its overall mandate in coordinating the country’s national security and 
public safety efforts.   
Within Public Safety Canada, a specific department, namely the Canadian Cyber Incident 
Response (CCIR), oversaw cybersecurity nationally. Two other agencies, the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS), the equivalent of the CIA in the U.S., and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP), worked with the CCIR and reported to the same federal government 
minister.  This approach made it much more challenging to develop a coordinated strategy since 
no one agency was responsible for overseeing the country’s national cybersecurity policies and 
laws.  Instead, the Canadian Government had to defer to various governmental agencies and 
private sectors to develop the programs, recommendations, guidelines, and publications aimed at 
meeting cybersecurity requirements, including best practices for various industries. 
As of November 1, 2018, in an acknowledgement that a more coordinated approach was 
needed, the Cyber Centre was charged with moving towards strengthening the country’s 
protection and defenses against cyber-attacks. According to the Canadian Centre for Cyber 
Security, their mandate is to become the “primary centralized voice and resource for senior 
leadership in Government on cyber security operational matters, including incident management, 
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situational awareness, and technical advice and guidance” (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 
2018, para. 4).  
While the Cyber Centre is not expected to have full operational capabilities until the 
spring of 2020, its creation should be seen as a step in the right direction especially given that it 
has been suggested by Rosenzweig (2012) that based on Canada’s Cybersecurity Strategy, first 
introduced and approved in 2010, Canada has not done as much work as the United States in 
developing a domestic government infrastructure for operationalizing cybersecurity.  Only time 
will tell if the establishment of the Cyber Centre has any impact as it works toward its overall 
objective of developing “stronger cyber protection, defense, and security for the Government, the 
private sector, and all Canadians” (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2018, p. 1). 
That said, there are no authorities or public administrative agencies specifically charged 
with regulating the conduct of businesses engaged in cyber activity.  Rather, the authorities that 
oversee specific sectors are generally responsible for determining policy and/or taking 
appropriate action for those that fall under their purview. As a result, the current legal and 
regulatory framework that exists in Canada to govern customer data and cyber security for 
private industry has developed over time, responding to issues as they arise, depending on the 
political will that existed at the time.   
The framework admittedly is fluid and will continue to change and evolve. Organizations 
that interact directly with consumers, regardless of size, are expected to adapt to this 
shifting framework, bearing in mind the various laws, programs, recommendations, guidelines, 
and regulatory expectations.  Included in this framework are: 
• Personal Information Protection and Electronic Act (PIPEDA), 
• Criminal Code of Canada (CCC), 
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• Canada’s Anti-Spam Law (CASL), 
• Case Law, and 
• U.S. Patriot Act 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Act (PIPEDA) – while not specific 
to FRFIs, there are many statutes that require organizations to protect personal information that 
they collect and within their possession or control, most notably PIPEDA.  PIPEDA, as well as 
the various provincial privacy laws that exist, is intended to protect the individual privacy rights 
of consumers by requiring that organizations implement “appropriate security protocols” (Sirivar 
& Wolch, 2017) in order to protect the data they collect.  It is meant to protect the use and 
storage of employee personal information by federally-regulated organizations (such as banks, 
insurance companies, and telecommunications companies), as well as protection of personal 
information of customers collected in the course of commercial activities federally (and in any 
provincial jurisdictions that do not have substantially similar legislation). PIPEDA applies within 
the geographical borders of Canada but also to all personal information that flows across national 
borders.  
Of note, however, is that PIPEDA does not apply in those provinces that have 
substantially similar legislation, a group that currently includes the provinces of Alberta, British 
Columbia, and Quebec.   To avoid any overlap in laws, those three provinces each have 
provincial legislation that applies in place of PIPEDA for residents in those provinces. This 
becomes complicated, as a result, for those companies that operate across various provincial 
jurisdictions, or for organizations that transfer personal information into a cloud environment; in 
both situations, a clear understanding of the applicable laws would be required in order to avoid 
any conflicts caused by gaps or overlaps in the regulatory frameworks.  
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The Criminal Code of Canada (the CCC) defines the following activities to be criminal 
in nature as they relate to ‘unauthorized access’ of computers and computer networks:  
• using a device willfully to intercept a private communication without the express or implied 
consent of the originators or intended recipient (Criminal Code, 1985, s 184(i)), and  
• 'intercepting fraudulently.... any function of a computer system' (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 
342(i)).  
Every G8 nation has a similar criminal framework that regulates ‘unauthorized access’, 
resulting in the criminalization of hacking activity.  Canada has a far broader application of its 
unauthorized access laws by simply referring to ‘‘everyone [who] commits mischief” (Craig, 
Shackelford, & Hiller, 2015).  This is significantly broader than the corresponding criminal 
standards in either the United Kingdom or the United States.   
As well, Canada is one of a few countries that also has no specific provision mandating 
the required level of security or protection for the breached computer system or data.  Other 
nations, such as Germany and Italy, require a specified degree of protective steps to be taken by 
the ‘owner’ of the computer. If these proactive steps cannot be demonstrated, the criminal law 
framework is not triggered (Craig, Shackelford, & Hiller, 2015). While any level of 'victim 
blaming' is distasteful in criminal contexts, this approach certainly serves to communicate the 
importance of all computer users engaging in safe, preventive practices. 
Canada’s Parliament has previously considered amending the CCC to authorize greater 
government access to, and control of, private internet communications to support their overall 
cybersecurity obligations.  Each attempt has failed, however, to win the necessary approval, 
perhaps signaling a strong view in Canada that any governmental regulation should be limited to 
only the most necessary and basic settings. 
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My recommendation to address this issue 
Canada passed the relevant provisions of its CCC over 40 years ago, shortly following the 
introduction of the 1986 U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), but prior to most other 
G8 members—including Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—passing similar laws in the 
1990s, while the remainder—including France, Italy, and Japan—did not regulate this behavior 
until the 2000s.  
 
A formal review of Canada’s Criminal Code should be undertaken once again to take advantage 
of what other countries have been doing to address hacking activity and cyber security. At the 
very least, a targeted, more specific approach in such an undertaking would assist in the overall 
objective of dealing with cyber-attacks. It can also be used to demonstrate increased 
expectations of private organizations and highlight the need for them to have in place a specified 
level of security before criminal charges could be brought to bear on those perpetrators behind 
breaches.  
 
Canada's Anti-Spam Law (CASL) is considered by many to perhaps be the toughest anti-
spam legislation in the world. The first phase of CASL, implemented in 2014, imposed 
requirements related to the sending of commercial electronic messages.  A year later, strict 
consent and notice rules came into place.  The administrative penalties for violating CASL are 
severe, with non-compliance risking financial penalties of up to $10 million dollars for 
corporations, as well as statutory damages of up to $1 million a day. Once again, these rules do 
not stop at the border of Canada.  CASL also contains provisions governing software installation, 
including aspects aimed at viruses and spyware. 
 
Case Law – privacy and data protection breach related claims in Canada, both individual 
and class action, continues to evolve and develop.  It is incumbent on financial institutions to 
monitor both OPC and court decisions to determine if any appropriate changes to their overall 
efforts in both securing data and in response to breaches need to be made. 
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U.S. Patriot Act - interestingly enough, one of the laws that impact organizations in 
Canada is not a law passed by Canadian authorities.  The United and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (The Patriot 
Act), is a piece of U.S. legislation that has provoked significant concerns from Canadian 
businesses, stemming largely from a deep uncertainty, and arguably a lack of trust, as to its 
application and interpretation. Multinational companies, with operations located in both the 
United States and Canada, fall under this law as does, more importantly, the customer data 
coming from Canada as it flows across borders. 
Canadian companies remain wary of their accountability to their customers if, due to the 
application of the Patriot Act, their ‘parent’ U.S. organization proceeds to disclose personal 
customer information without the consent of the Canadian individuals involved.  This could 
result in the Canadian organization that transferred the information violating Canadian privacy 
legislation in order to comply with the Patriot Act.  This could be addressed through ensuring the 
customer understands that their information could end up being shared with the company’s US 
counterpart but does not necessarily eliminate confusion around its applicability and raises 
various competitive concerns.  The issue for our purposes would similarly apply if a cyber 
breach occurred to the U.S. organization and Canadian customer information was accessed. 
 
 
Perhaps more importantly, personal customer information held by the Canadian office of 
a multinational insurance company, for example, on a shared network system, and accessible to 
colleagues in its U.S. operation, may constitute custody by the U.S. company and could lead to 
an order, under the Patriot Act, to produce that information to U.S. authorities.  Taken to a 
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possible conclusion, if a cyber breach occurs, while this information is in the possession of a 
U.S. organization or even the U.S. authorities, what are the repercussions to the Canadian 
organization and its customers?  
As a result, the possible implication of the Patriot Act on businesses and individuals in 
Canada remain quite relevant but still relatively unknown. At this point, no existing federal law 
in Canada addresses this issue.  But because some Canadians have become so worried about the 
flow of their private information into the hands of U.S. authorities, several provinces in the 
country (currently Nova Scotia, Quebec, and British Columbia) have passed laws governing the 
demands for information by U.S. authorities (Siegel, Denny & Poff, 2019). 
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
There remains much uncertainty surrounding the US Patriot Act as it relates to responding to 
foreign orders and the Canadian Government needs to provide clarity, at the federal level, to 
Canadian organizations, especially on the interaction between PIPEDA and the Patriot Act.   
Clarification directly from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, or through amendments to 






Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
 
In Canada, failure to understand the complex legal and regulatory framework, which has 
developed over time, around the collection and protection of customer data has its risks.  
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Companies need to take active steps to reduce risks (or the impact of these risks when they 
materialize) as they can have serious legal and financial consequences. So, it is crucial for 
organizations that operate fully or partially in Canada, or that even have business partners 
operating in Canada, to truly appreciate and understand the applicable laws and regulations.   
As mentioned previously, both federal and provincial privacy laws (at least in those 
provinces where they exist) dictate how businesses are expected to collect, use, and disclose the 
personal information of their customers. While the intent is to protect the individual privacy 
rights of Canadian citizens, the laws, as they stand currently, only require that organizations take 
‘appropriate’ steps in establishing and implementing security measures and controls to protect 
their customer information. While the measure of what constitutes 'appropriate’ steps is subject 
to continued interpretation by both the courts and the OPC, it does not communicate an 
objectively high standard to organizations operating in Canada. 
This is clearly illustrated in PIPEDA Report of Findings #2018-001. Stemming from a 
complaint made to the OPC that VTech failed to adequately protect personal information of 
customers, or in other words, that they did not take the ‘appropriate’ steps, it was determined that 
the company suffered a privacy breach, impacting over 550,000 Canadians.   
The report highlights that VTech did not have any of the following safeguards in place: 
• A program of regular testing to identify common vulnerabilities 
• No security monitoring and login to detect potential threats 
• Poor administrative access controls, and 
• No comprehensive security management program   
To most observers, implementing strong information system controls, or identifying 
existing vulnerabilities and testing controls, would be considered   basic steps to any effective 
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approach to cyber security, let alone to be considered ‘appropriate’ steps.  However, since the 
term remains subjective it is up to each organization to determine what it deems to be 
appropriate.  
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
 
Administrative, cybersecurity and physical safeguards should form the basis of every organizations 
privacy protection regime as they look to protect the sensitive and personal information of their 
customers.  Such measures go a long way in helping an organization demonstrate their overall 
commitment to data privacy.  
 
If the OPC continues to believe that ‘appropriate steps’ should be the measure of what a company 
should have in place, there is a need to at least demonstrate and require the basic steps that should 
be part of any regime. For example, with the recently implemented GDPR legislation in Europe, it 
includes prescriptive responsibilities when it comes to security rather than leaving it up to each 
organization to determine what might be appropriate. It is really this type of clarification, either 
directly from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, or through amendments to PIPEDA that is 
needed to demonstrate their expectations and in turn to hold organizations responsible and 
accountable for what they do, or do not do, in securing their computer networks. 
 
 
As a result, the private sector, while playing a crucial role in implementing robust 
security measures to combat cyber threats, is initially only driven to meet the minimal steps as 
required by laws and regulations.  Perhaps more importantly, as way to demonstrate to 
stakeholders that they are sufficiently capable of safeguarding the personal and corporate data 
that is being captured and warehoused, some organizations may strive for more than simply 
implementing the ‘appropriate’ steps required of them.  This can lead to targeted cyber-attacks 
against those companies deemed to be more vulnerable as a result. 
 
Organizations face even greater challenges in managing third-party vendors providing 
cloud-located services if they decide to ‘outsource’ this function as there is no contractual 
relationship between those vendors and the ultimate customer.  In the absence of such a direct 
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contractual relationship between the ‘customer’ of the business and the ‘vendor’ of the business, 
the intermediary organization that initially collects the information actually has a higher duty of 
care to ensure that the necessary safeguards are in place by the ‘vendor’ to secure this 
information.  This is not only the expectation of their customers but also the government as well 
 
Statutory Framework – PIPEDA:  
Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act 
 
PIPEDA is considered by many to be the single most important legislation in Canada that 
directly addresses the issue of collecting, controlling and storing of personal information, 
containing various provisions applicable to data protection and cybersecurity.   
  While this statute is quite extensive, it is important to highlight the following items from 
the Act as they relate to the various privacy practices of commercial organizations (PIPEDA, 
2000): 
1. As mentioned previously, organizations are ultimately responsible for the personal 
information they collect and/or is under their control; 
2. Organizations must designate an individual who is accountable for overall compliance with 
PIPEDA; 
3. Personal information is given a broad definition and includes “any factual or subjective 
information, recorded or not, about an identifiable individual” (PIPEDA, 2000, sec.3). Some 
common examples include items like age, name, ID numbers, income, ethnic origin or blood 
type. However, it encompasses much more, including opinions, evaluations, comments, social 
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status, or disciplinary actions.  All are considered sensitive or "Personally Identifiable 
Information" (PII) and is explicitly protected under the law; 
4. PII must be protected by security safeguards. The protective safeguards companies establish, 
both physical and digital, must be able to protect personal information against loss or theft, as 
well as unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or modification, regardless of where or the 
format in which the information is held; 
5. The nature of the safeguards is driven by the overall sensitivity of the information in question; 
the more sensitive the information the higher level of protection is required; and,  
6. The methods of protection are to include physical measures (ex. restricted access to offices), 
organizational measures (ex. security clearances and limiting access), and technological 
measures (ex. passwords and encryption). 
PIPEDA is similar to other privacy laws in other jurisdictions in that organizations "must 
obtain an individual’s consent when they collect, use or disclose that individual’s personal 
information. People have the right to access their personal information held by an organization. 
They also have the right to challenge its accuracy" (PIPEDA, 2000, c5). 
Recent amendments to PIPEDA, effective in late 2018 although passed in 2015, now 
require very specific security breach notification requirements be met by businesses.  Not only 
are they required to inform affected individuals as well as the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner (OPC) but also keep all records dealing with the issue related to the breach. 
Canada has been looked as a leader in establishing guidelines on data breach notification and 
reporting. Canada’s approach has in fact helped shape similar guidelines to those that exist in 
New Zealand and Australia (Siegel, Denny and Poff, 2019). While notification and reporting are 
important parts of any countries breach notification process, is this the area that a country wants 
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to be seen as a leader in?  Does this not demonstrate an emphasis on reacting after a breach 
occurs rather than on ensuring that the necessary protocols are in place to avoid a breach from 
occurring to begin with? 
Penalties, however, appear to be much smaller for PIPEDA violations when compared to 
other privacy regulations like those in the U.S. or the current General Data Protection 
Requirements (GDPR) 2  for Europe. For example, failure to report a breach to both the OPC and 
to the affected customers, and cases where no record of total data breaches are kept can cost 
organizations fines only up to $100,000. 
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
The Canadian Government could consider increasing the level of fines given when privacy 
breaches occur to match those of other countries like the U.S., and those in the European Union.  
Perhaps they should be more in line with the administrate penalties attached to CASL, which 
requires that organizations receive consent from customers before sending messages, where 
penalties of up to $1,000,000 per violation for individuals and $10,000,000 for organizations 
exist. This would demonstrate that protecting the personal information of their customers is as 
important as seeking their permission before sharing such information. 
 
As well, if the Canadian Government is truly serious about ensuring organizations have invested 
properly in cybersecurity an, alternative would be for the OPC to ‘incentivize’ rather than 
simply apply fines.  The amount of any fine could instead be required to be re-investing back into 
company’s IT efforts to better secure their systems.  This would necessitate perhaps that the OPC 
work closely with the appropriate government regulatory agency, and the organization in 
question, to ensure that the amount of the ‘fines’ are used appropriately and in addition to 
normal budgeted expenses, but such an approach would tie in nicely with the federal 
governments stated objective of partnership and collaboration.  
 
Outside of some slight amendments, there have been no substantive changes to PIPEDA 
since it was introduced in 2000.   At that time, nearly twenty years ago, the European 
 
2 The fine framework for a violation under GDPR can be as much as 20 million euros (equivalent to more than 30 million Cdn$) 
CANADIAN CYBER SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATONS                                              28 
 
Commission formally highlighted that Canada’s federal privacy law provided an adequate level 
of protection for personal data from the European Union (EU) to residents in Canada (European 
Commission, 2002, p.13-16). 
PIPEDA, however, was recognized recently by the former Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, Jennifer Stoddart, as outdated. (Hammond, 2010) In her opinion, Canada’s privacy laws 
are in need of a major overhaul. The privacy issues the country currently faces are much more 
complex than they were at the turn of the century.  Canadian privacy laws were introduced with a 
principles-based approach, providing organizations more flexibility than the more prescriptive 
privacy laws that exist in some other jurisdictions. However, privacy and security challenges 
have evolved over time and the privacy framework that was initially created can be seen as 
largely insufficient to deal with today’s challenges.   
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
The OPC should undertake a substantive, formal review of PIPEDA, with appropriate 
recommendations to be made to the Canadian Government, looking at best practices that other 
countries use related to cybersecurity.  Such changes should be implemented in an appropriate 
and timely manner. The piecemeal approach of dealing with different issues and different times 
is disconcerting.  
 
For example, PIPEDA was amended in 2015 and gave company’s three years to adjust to the 
new mandatory breach reporting requirements implemented as of November 1, 2018.  The EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) came into force in May of 2018 and could likely 
lead to revisions to Canadian privacy laws depending on what comes of the EUs expectations of 
personal data of EU residents that is stored and processed in Canada. 
 
PIPEDA does not require complete and total impenetrability against cyber breaches.  Whether 
theoretically possible or not, there is a need though to move beyond the current requirements 
that organizations simply meet the ‘reasonableness’ standard in terms of the security safeguards 
in place or that the security safeguards be ‘appropriate’ given the sensitivity of the information 
in question.  
 
 






A complex corporate regulatory framework has evolved over time in Canada that partners 
with statutory laws to collectively look to ensure the protection of consumer data and to address 
related issues of cyber security. Although many attackers are targeting larger, high-profile 
companies, all businesses should be prepared for such events, regardless of their size or 
complexity.  As organizations consider how best to optimize for profit the use of the data that 
they collect from their customers, an equally serious level of attention needs to be given to best 
practices for protecting that critical data.  The importance of addressing cyber security at the all 
levels of government and at the highest levels of corporate leadership cannot be understated.  
The increasing sophistication of cyber hackers (and hacktivists3), along with the expanding scope 
and frequency of data breaches should demonstrate the stakes that exist for national governments 
around the world as their respective citizens look to them to combat the risks. 
Two key pieces to the regulatory and governance framework in Canada include:  
1. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), a federal regulatory body 
that oversee Federal Regulated Financial Institutions (FRFIs), including all banks, insurance 
companies and federal pension plans, and  
2. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), an umbrella organization of Canada’s 
provincial and territorial securities regulators.   
 
3 A recent phenomenon involving individual or collective groups of hackers targeting corporations and government bodies alike, 
penetrating and wreaking havoc on computer systems motivated by ideological beliefs rather than personal financial gain. 
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Concentrating on OSFI, given its oversight on Federal Regulated Financial Institutions, it 
is still important to highlight that there are rules and regulations that apply to the securities’ 
sector as well. However, unlike any other major federation, Canada lacks a securities regulatory 
authority at the federal government level, instead relying on the individual provinces and 
territories to regulate the securities industry.  
For Federal Regulated Financial Institutions, OSFI “regulates by developing rules, 
interpreting legislation and regulations and providing regulatory approvals for certain types of 
transactions” (Canada, OSFI, 2009, p.1).  Through various “Guidelines” OSFI has provided   
"best" or "prudent" practices that they expect federally regulated financial institutions to follow. 
These Guidelines set standards for industry activities and behavior. 
However, there are currently no guidelines or regulatory requirements with respect to 
cybersecurity specifically.  Instead, OSFI’s B-10 Guideline Outsourcing of Business Activities, 
Functions and Processes sets out their expectations with respect to “financial 
institutions…[who]…outsource business activities, functions and processes to meet the 
challenges of technological innovation, increased specialization, cost control, and heightened 
competition” (Canada, OSFI, 2009, para. 1).  While OSFI has recognized the benefits that new 
technology-based services, such as Cloud Computing, can provide to organizations, they have 





CANADIAN CYBER SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATONS                                              31 
 
Looking more closely at offsite cloud computing, it helps to return to the requirements of 
PIPEDA, including the clear accountability that any organization assumes once it begins to 
collect data, regardless of its jurisdiction, industry or the type of data involved. These 
organizations are deemed immediately to be “fully accountable and responsible for the 
protection of said data.  Organizations are responsible for personal information in its possession 
or custody, including information that has been transferred to a third party for handling and/or 
processing” (PIPEDA, 2000, c 5). 
  It is this last part that is important for these purposes.  It would be far easier (and 
tempting) to simply rely on a third-party, cloud provider to manage all the inherent risks and 
regulatory accountability associated with protecting personal information within the possession 
of the provider. However, that is not where the responsibility lies within PIPEDA. Similarly, 
OSFI has made it equally clear that all FRFIs falling under their jurisdiction are responsible for 
ensuring that all laws and regulations are being met related to the protection of personal 
information, notwithstanding whether that service is outsourced or not.  As referenced in their B-
10 Guideline, OSFI operates on the premise that FRFI’s “retain ultimate accountability for all 
outsourced activities” (Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions [OSIF], 
2009). 
Even before considering moving to a cloud environment, organizations are expected to 
take the following due diligence steps (Canada, OSFI, 2009): 
1. assess and define the scope of the services they are considered, based on their specific needs, 
2. review and evaluate the different laws and regulations the organization needs to comply with 
as this may well define the type of service that can be used,  
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3. gauge, and then rate, any services they deploy to a third part cloud provider with respect to 
how critical it is to their business.  
  Guideline B-10 does stress that organizations are, prior to outsourcing any business, 
required to determine whether the agreement is ‘material’ to its operation by considering the 
following questions (Canada, OSFI, 2009): 
  
• What is the impact of the outsourcing arrangement on the overall business of the 
organization? 
• Will the organization be able to implement internal controls should the service provider fail? 
• Is it difficult and/or costly to find an alternative provider in a reasonable period of time? 
• Can the function or service be brought back in-house if necessary? 
 
  The type and level of materiality is to dictate the risk management program which 
organizations are expected to have in place, and should include the evaluation of items like:  
• Confidentiality, security, and separation of property,  
• Contingency planning,  
• Location of records,  
• Access and audit rights,  
• Subcontracting, and  
• Monitoring the material outsourcing arrangements. 
 
The process includes the need to perform appropriate due diligence, assess each service provider 
being considered, document the ultimate decision made, and have the appropriate contracts in 
place.  
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Guideline B-10 is not binding on firms though and there is no current requirement that 
FRFIs provide OSFI with any formal notification if they enter into any contractual arrangement. 
The question that begs to be asked is why, if these are truly prudent practices and/or standards, 
OSFI does not require they be followed and why it is not more heavily engaged in the 
verification process if an outsourcing activity, like Cloud Computer, is being considered. 
Appreciating that there was a need for some level of clarity, OSFI, in 2012, supplemented 
Guideline B-10 with a Memorandum re: New Technology-Based Outsourcing Arrangements 
(Canada, OSFI, 2012). Intended to specifically address the issues raised by cloud computing, the 
memo states that FRFIs should recognize the unique features of these new technology-based 
services, consider the associated risks and abide by the expectations contained in Guideline B-
10.   
However, to be clear, OSFI does not look, or even ask, for prior approval before such 
agreements are entered into by individual corporations. Instead, they have emphasized the 
importance of FRFIs ensuring that the outsourcing provider regularly tests their business 
recovery systems.  With reasonable notice, OSFI can request a summary of these tests.  This 
reactive approach though, again likely requested after a breach may have occurred, is insufficient 
to overcome concerns raised by many (Hammond, 2010).  
A Canadian Privacy report found a range of “privacy-specific issues inherent in the cloud 
infrastructure”, specific to such issues as data ownership, data “permanence”, misuse of data, 
data intrusions, and security (Hammond 2010, para. 2). Perhaps of most importance is the 
Privacy Commissioners (OPC) concerns with Cloud Computing in general and specifically as it 
relates to cyber security.  The OPC has questioned that while the users, in our case FRFIs, pay 
CANADIAN CYBER SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATONS                                              34 
 
for such a service, they are not provided with either “the expertise or control over the technology 
infrastructure that provides these services” (Hammond, 2010, para. 6). 
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
OSFI should conduct audits of all cloud computer providers who would like to offer their 
services to Canadian customers (ex. FRFIs) to determine if they meet current guidelines, with the 
corresponding costs to be incorporated in the annual fees that companies are already charged 
by OSFI. This proactive approach to ‘screening’ Cloud Computing providers would go a long 
way in demonstrated the overall desire for the partnership that the Canadian Government 




In 2013, OSFI released their Cyber-Security Self-Assessment Guidance (Canada, OSFI, 
2013) document, including a template risk assessment tool, to assist FRFIs.  Businesses are 
“encouraged” to use the template or similar assessment tools to gauge their overall readiness and 
implement additional cyber security measures, if necessary. 
That said, written memorandums to the financial services’ industry noted that they, OSFI, 
may request companies complete the self-assessment template during upcoming and future 
supervisory reviews and assessments.  However, again this suggests a preference to a reactive 
approach in dealing with the issue, i.e., occurring after a breach has occurred.  
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
OSFI should not only require, rather than simply ‘encourage’, federally regulated financial 
institutions to complete the self-assessment (using the recommended tool or similar tool) but 
companies should have to file these self-assessments with OSFI on an annual basis, including 
any additional steps that need to be taken to maintain acceptable levels of cyber-security 
preparedness. 
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The template calls for a self-assessment rating from 1 to 4 (“Not Implemented” through 
to “Fully Implemented”) for each of several criteria grouped within six categories, including: 
• Organization and Resources 
• Cyber Risk and Control  
• Situation Awareness 
• Threat and Vulnerability Risk Management 
• Cybersecurity Incident Management 
• Cybersecurity Governance 
 
 
What is noteworthy as it pertains to governance is that it is clear OSFI holds boards as 
ultimately responsible for overseeing the management of cybersecurity for the organization they 
oversee, for even the most highly technical matters.  However, is this feasible?  Do board 
members have enough education or corporate information to make appropriate decisions around 
cybersecurity? Some might argue that given the expense involved in protecting an organization 
against cyber-attacks there may indeed be a conflict given the board of directors financially 
motivated objectives as well.  And while CEOs typically pay the price after a major breach 
occurs, board members “who should be front and center in cybersecurity discussions stay silently 
in the background” (Zimmerman, 2018). 
 
My recommendation to address this issue 
OSFI should require mandatory annual training for all board members in the area of cyber 
security. The curriculum should be developed and/or approved by OSFI to guarantee it meets the 
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necessary criteria to ensure board members gain an appreciation for the risks associated with 
cyber-attacks, the overall need for security, and the responsibilities that board members have in 
their oversight capacity.  
 
OSFI recently announced, via an advisory letter (Canada, OSFI, 2019), that as of March 
31st, all FRFI's are required to begin reporting all technology and cybersecurity incidents directly 
to OSFI, marking a very similar approach being taken by the OPC, given its recent revisions in 
reporting requirements.  OSFIs new requirements, however, appear to be somewhat more 
stringent.  For example, notification is required regardless of whether the incident involves 
personal information, and an FRFI must notify OSFI of an incident as “promptly as possible but 
no later than 72 hours” after determining a breach occurred.   
OSFI’s fixed notification period of 72 hours differs in PIPEDA's approach, which 
mandates all companies to notify appropriate parties, including the OPC, individuals and third-
party organizations of breaches of security safeguards “as soon as feasible” after it has 
determined that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to an individual.  There is an 
understanding, if not an appreciation, that it takes some time for organizations to investigate 
possible breaches to determine possible impacts. 
Only time will tell if OSFI and the OPC move towards a similar reporting process which 
will likely alleviate concerns that organizations may well end up having as a result of such 
duplicate and yet differing requirements.  Suffice to say it again appears that more effort is being 
spent to deal with issues after the fact rather than on the front end to ensure that companies have 
the necessary processes and frameworks in place to prevent breaches from occurring.  
  Finally, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 did result in the financial service’s 
regulatory landscape in Canada, the U.S., as well as other countries around the world, moving 
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into a constant state of flux. More and more regulators are leaving less and less to interpretation 
and moving away from principles-based regulation to an ever more prescriptive rule making 
approach. In order to keep up with new requirements, firms are increasingly forced to direct 
resources from strategic initiatives towards non-discretionary spending on compliance and 
supporting technology. However, OSFI has seemed to have gone ‘against the grain’ by 
maintaining a less prescriptive approach than some other regulators.  OSFI has in fact 
emphasized in past statements that it did not ‘plan to establish specific guidance for the control 














This paper has analyzed the current threats and challenges that organizations face in 
securing their networks against cyber-attacks and protecting the customer information they 
collect during their course of their operation. As it stands, and without revisions to current 
standards, policies and practices, the current regulatory and legal framework that exists in 
Canada is not nearly strong enough to address the sophisticated level of threats, protect 
consumers, and oversee the financial institutions that operate in the country.  While the 
recommendations highlighted in this paper are but a sampling, rather than a comprehensive 
assessment, they provide a roadmap to begin to address the ways in which organizations can be 
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assisted by legislative frameworks in ensuring that the necessary security measures are being 
implemented.  
The Canadian Government has made a number of strong indications that more needs to 
be done. The most recent Canadian federal budget from early in 2018, for example, proposed 
various cybersecurity-related commitments, most notably over $155 million set aside over a five-
year period so that the Communications Security Establishment can create a new “Canadian 
Centre for Cyber Security.” This is important as it would result in a single source of expertise, 
“providing Canadian citizens and businesses with a clear and trusted place in turn to for cyber 
security advice” (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2018, p. 1).  
This was quickly followed in the summer of 2018 by another positive move when 
Canadian Government renewed its overall commitment to implementing a strong cyber security 
regime when it published its new National Cyber Security Strategy.  Reference was made that 
Canada recognizes “evolving threats, emerging opportunities, and the need for collaborative 
action” (Canada, Public Safety Canada, 2018, p. 1).  Three themes were consistently raised in its 
strategy document focusing on: (1) privacy, (2) collaboration, and (3) using skilled cyber 
security personnel.  Of particularly note is the goal that the “federal government, in close 
collaboration with provinces, territories, and the private sector, will take a leadership role to 
advance cyber security in Canada and will, in coordination with allies, work to shape the 
international cyber security environment in Canada’s favor” (Canada, Public Safety Canada, 
2018, p. 1). 
While all might be considered important and necessary steps in laying the proper 
foundation in moving forward, they fall short in implementing new regulatory and legal 
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requirements for federally regulated financial institutions that operate in the country. There is a 
level of urgency in beginning such an effort sooner rather than later as it takes time to move from 
one regime to another.   
For example, the European Commission acknowledged back in 2010 that their privacy 
regime, at the time known as the Data Protection Directive (DPD), was no longer affective or 
appropriate given the rising technological developments experienced around the world. At the 
time, they indicated that personal data must be ‘effectively’ protected, whatever the technology 
used to process their data’.  Even though the DPD was for all intents and purposes repealed n 
2012, it took an additional six years for their new regulation, the GDPR, to be implemented 
(European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
2010). 
As well, regulators and corporations in Canada were slow to respond to things like Big 
Data and Cloud Computing (Dupont, 2013).  Should Canadian society feel confident that these 
same regulators and corporations in turn are addressing the new security challenges posed by 
additional items like the Internet of Things (IoT), brain-computer interfaces, near field 
communication payments systems or mobile robots?  Each result in an increase in the overall 
amount of data collected by organizations, an increase in the connection points across the 
Internet, as well as the speed and velocity that this information flows throughout these 
interconnected systems.   
The use of smart home devices, for example, has been growing in Canada.  It is estimated 
that within the next 5 years over 35% of Canadians will use a smart device in their home 
(Canada, Statistics Canada, 2018). These devices pose both a privacy risk and cybersecurity risk 
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given their connection to the internet. No specific law in Canada currently exists addressing this 
emerging risk and there are no indications that one will be forthcoming.  Existing laws offer little 
protection and   PIPEDA is in no way strong enough to regulate companies, either 
manufacturers, retailers or users.  If the Canadian Government took the initiative and responded 
to the Privacy Commissioner’s concerns, then we may see news laws and regulations that must 
be followed.  
The G7 Cybersecurity Guidelines for the Financial Sector laid out best practices that 
could be applied across the member countries.  Canada can do more to learn from the other G7 
countries, i.e. France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, including 
incorporating some of the recommendations already highlighted in this paper that they are 
engaged in. 
And while Canada’s new National Cyber Security Strategy highlights their goal in the 
area of cyber innovation ‘by supporting advanced research, fostering digital innovation, and 
developing cyber skills and knowledge’ this may be more of a panacea given that, according to 
McLeod (2018), Canada is already facing a talent shortage as it relates to cybersecurity experts. 
Current projections indicate that the demand for cyber experts is growing by 7 percent each year, 
according to a report from Deloitte. This not only provides a challenge to Canada’s objective of 
leading the world in cyber innovation but puts companies at risk in not having the necessary 
resources to deal with both existing and new emerging risks in the future.  
As we struggle with the global phenomenon of appropriate cybersecurity frameworks that 
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